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Abstract
Recently there are several works which analyzed the strategy−proofness of non−resolute
social choice rules such as Duggan and Schwartz (2000) and Ching and Zhou (2001). In these
analyses it was assumed that individual preferences are linear, that is, they excluded
indifference from individual preferences. We present an analysis of the strategy−proofness of
non−resolute social choice rules when indifference in individual preferences is allowed.
Following to the definition of the strategy−proofness by Ching and Zhou (2001) we shall
show that a generalized version of monotonicity and the strategy−proofness are equivalent. It
is an extension of the equivalence of monotonicity and the strategy−proofness for resolute
social choice rules with linear individual preferences proved by Muller and Satterthwate
(1980) to the case of non−resolute social choice rules with general individual preferences.
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The problem of strategy-proofness for non-resolute (or set-valued, multi-valued)
social choice correspondences recently has been analyzed in several works, for ex-
ample, Duggan and Schwartz (2000) and Ching and Zhou (2001). In these analy-
ses it was assumed that individual preferences over alternatives are linear (or strict,
asymmetric), that is, they excluded indiﬀerence from individual preferences.
Ching and Zhou (2001) established that when individual preferences are linear,
social choice correspondences are single-valued or constant. But if indiﬀerence is
allowed, their result does not hold.
We present an analysis of strategy-proofness for non-resolute social choice cor-
respondences when indiﬀerence in individual preferences is allowed. Following
the deﬁnition of strategy-proofness by Ching and Zhou (2001) we shall show that
a generalized version of monotonicity (generalized monotonicity) and strategy-
proofness are equivalent. It is an extension of the equivalence of monotonicity
(or strong positive association) and strategy-proofness for resolute social choice
rules with linear individual preferences proved by Muller and Satterthwaite (1977)
to the case of non-resolute social choice rules with individual preferences which
allow indiﬀerence.
In the next section we present notation, deﬁnitions and preliminary results. In
Section 3 we shall show the equivalence of generalized monotonicity and strategy-
proofness.
2 Notation, deﬁnitions and a preliminary result
There is a society with n individuals, and a social problem with more than two al-
ternatives. n is a ﬁnite positive integer which is larger than 1, and the number of the
alternatives is a ﬁnite positive integer which is larger than 2. The set of individuals
is denoted by N, and the set of alternatives is denoted by A. The individuals are
represented by individual i, j and so on, and the alternatives are represented by x,
y, z and so on. The preference of individual i over the alternatives is represented
by a weak order Ri, which is reﬂexive, complete (connected) and transitive. The
asymmetric part (strict preference) and the symmetric part (indiﬀerence) of Ri are
denoted by Pi and Ii. xPiy means that individual i prefers x to y, and so on.
A social choice correspondence (or voting rule) is a mapping from an n-tuple
of individual preferences to a subset of A. It is non-resolute, that is, it may choose
multiple alternatives. We assume unrestricted domain of social choice correspon-
dences. An n-tuple of individual preferences is called a proﬁle of individual pref-
1erences (or an individual preference proﬁle). The proﬁles are denoted by a, b, c




i . Denote the set of alternatives chosen by a social choice correspondence at
a proﬁle a by C(a). We call it the social choice set at a.
non-imposition and non-constancy Weassumethatsocialchoicecorrespondences
are non-imposed or onto, that is, their ranges are A. It means that for any al-
ternative there is an individual preference proﬁle at which the alternative is
included in the social choice set. This assumption implies that any alterna-
tive may be included in some social choice set. But we do not assume that
there is a proﬁle at which any alternative may be chosen by a social choice
correspondence as a singleton social choice set.
If social choice sets for all individual preference proﬁles are identical, the
social choice correspondence is said to be constant. Because such a social
choice rule is not interesting, we assume that social choice correspondences
are not constant. It implies that there is at least one individual preference
proﬁle (denoted by a) at which the social choice set does not include all
alternatives, that is, C(a) , A.
Although a social choice set may include multiple alternatives, only one alter-
native actually realizes. Each individual (represented by i) has a subjective prob-
ability measure p and a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function ui over A. If
we have ui(x) > ui(y) when xPiy and ui(x) = ui(y) when xIiy, it is said that ui is
consistent with the preference of individual i.
Next, we deﬁne (strategic) manipulability and strategy-proofness of a social
choice correspondence following the deﬁnition by Ching and Zhou (2001)1). Let a
and b be two proﬁles of individual preferences between which only the preference
of individual i is diﬀerent, and let C(a) and C(b) be the social choice sets at a and
b. Denote the set of alternatives which are included in C(a) but not included in
C(b) by C(a) \ C(b), and the set of alternatives which are included in C(b) but not
included in C(a) by C(b) \ C(a), and denote the value of individual i’s subjective
probability measure on x by p(x). Then, his expected utility conditional on C(a)
1)The deﬁnition ofmanipulability by Duggan andSchwartz (2000) is diﬀerent from thatby Ching
and Zhou (2001). The former requires that misrepresentation of an individual’s preference makes
him better oﬀ for every prior subjective probabilities. On the other hand, the latter requires that
misrepresentation makes him better oﬀ for some prior. We think that the deﬁnition by Duggan and
Schwartz (2000) is too strong.
2and that conditional on C(b) evaluated by his utility function which is consistent
























If C(a) = C(b), we have Ea
i (a) = Ea






























If for all probability measures and utility functions which are consistent with his
preference at a we have Ea
i (a) ≥ Ea
i (b), the social choice correspondence is not ma-
nipulable. Conversely, if for some probability measure and some utility function
we have Ea
i (a) < Ea
i (b), individual i has an incentive to reveal Rb
i (his preference at
b) when his true preference is Ra
i, and the social choice correspondence is manip-
ulable by individual i at a. For example, assume that p(x) = 0.8 − ε, p(y) = 0.2,
ua
i(x) = 0, ua
i(y) = 1 and ua
i(z) = 2 for the alternative z which is the most preferred
alternative of individual i in C(a). ε(0 < ε < 1) is the sum of the probabilities of
alternatives other than x and y.
From (1) and (2), if for some x ∈ C(a) and some y ∈ C(b)\C(a) the preference
of individual i is yPa
i x, we obtain
E
a







Let ε be suﬃciently small (such that ε ≤ 0.07), then we obtain Ea
i (a) < Ea
i (b).
Similarly, ifforsome x ∈ C(a)\C(b)andsomey ∈ C(b)thepreferenceofindividual
i is yPa












Let ε be suﬃciently small (such that ε ≤ 0.1), then we obtain Ea
i (a) < Ea
i (b).
Summarizing the results,
Lemma 1. If for some x ∈ C(a) and some y ∈ C(b) \ C(a) the preference of
individual i is yPa
i x, or for some x ∈ C(a)\C(b) and some y ∈ C(b) the preference of
individual i is yPa
i x, the social choice correspondence is manipulable by individual
i at a preference proﬁle a by Rb
i.
Conversely, if for all x ∈ C(a) and y ∈ C(b)\C(a), and for all x ∈ C(a)\C(b) and
y ∈ C(b) the preference of individual i is xRa
iy, the social choice correspondence is
not manipulable.
strategy-proofness If a social choice correspondence is not manipulable by any
individual at any individual preference proﬁle, it is strategy-proof.
Ching and Zhou (2001) showed that when individual preferences are linear,
social choice correspondences are single-valued or constant. But if indiﬀerence is
allowed, their result does not hold. There is a simple example. Deﬁne the social
choice set for each proﬁle as the maximal set of individual 1 for that proﬁle, and
assume that his maximal set is not constant and may be multi-valued for some
proﬁles. Then, the social choice correspondence is strategy-proof, neither constant
nor single-valued.
Let us consider an example of a manipulable voting rule.
An example There are three individuals 1, 2 and 3, and three alternatives, x, y





















Between a and b only individual 3’s preference is diﬀerent. Consider a so-called
Borda rule. Each individual assigns 3 points to his most preferred alternative, 2
points to the second, 1 point to the third and 0 to the last, and the social choice
set consists of the alternatives which get the largest total points. Then, we obtain
C(a) = {x,y,z} and C(b) = {y,z}. Let px, py and pz be the subjective probabilities
of individual 3 on x, y and z, and let ux, uy and uy be the values of his utility of x,
4y and z at the proﬁle a. Then, if the following relations holds, this voting rule is
manipulable by him at a by Rb
i.
pz(uz − uy) > py(ux − uy)
Next, we deﬁne generalized monotonicity2).
generalized monotonicity Suppose that at a proﬁle of individual preferences a
such that for a pair of alternatives (x,y)
(1) individuals in a group V (V ⊂ N): xPa
iy
(2) individuals in a group V0 (V0 ⊂ N, V0 ∩ V = ∅): xIa
i y
(3) others (group V00): yPa
i x
a social choice correspondence chooses x and does not choose y (x ∈ C(a)
and y < C(a)). We do not assume any speciﬁcation of individual preferences
about alternatives other than x and y. There is another proﬁle b such that
(1) individuals in V: xPb
iy, other preferences are not speciﬁed
(2) individuals in V0: xPb
iy or their preferences are completely identical to
those at a
(3) V00: not speciﬁed
Then, the social choice correspondence does not choose y at b (y < C(b)).
First we show the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Strategy-proofness implies generalized monotonicity.
In the following proof we use notation in the above deﬁnition of generalized
monotonicity.
Proof. Let individuals 1 to m (0 ≤ m ≤ n) belong to V, individuals m + 1 to m0
(m ≤ m0 ≤ n) belong to V0, and individuals m0 + 1 to n belong to V00. Consider
a preference proﬁle c other than a and b such that individuals in V and V0 have a
2)Our generalized monotonicity does not imply the so-called Maskin monotonicity, and the latter
does not imply the former. The Maskin monotonicity requires the following condition. There is a
preference proﬁle a at which x is included in the social choice set. There is another proﬁle b such
that between a and b the preference of only one individual (denoted by i) is diﬀerent, and xPb
i y for
y , x if xPa
i y. Then, x is included in the social choice set at b. See Maskin (1999)
5preference xPc
iyPc
iz, and individuals in V00 have a preference yPc
i xPc
iz, where z is an
arbitrary alternative other than x and y.
Let a1 be a preference proﬁle such that only the preference of individual 1
changes from Ra
1 to Rc
1, and suppose that at a1 the social choice correspondence
chooses y. Then, individual 1 has an incentive to reveal a false preference Ra
1 when
his true preference is Rc
1 because he prefers x to y at a1 and y is not chosen at a.
Thus, we have y < C(a1). Next, suppose that at a1 the social choice correspondence
does not choose x. Then, individual 1 has an incentive to reveal a false preference
Ra
1 when his true preference is Rc
1 because he prefers x to all other alternatives at
a1 and x is chosen at a. Thus, we have x ∈ C(a1). By the same logic we ﬁnd that
when the preferences of individuals 1 to m0 change from Ra
i to Rc
i, the social choice
correspondence chooses x and does not choose y (x ∈ C(am0
) and y < C(am0
)).
Next, let am0+1 be a preference proﬁle such that the preference of individual
m0 + 1, as well as the preferences of the ﬁrst m0 individuals, changes from Ra
m0+1
to Rc
m0+1, and suppose that at am0+1 the social choice correspondence chooses y.
Then, individual m0 +1 has an incentive to reveal a false preference Rc
m0+1 when his
true preference is Ra
m0+1 because yPa
m0+1x. On the other hand, if the social choice
correspondence does not choose x and chooses an alternative z(, x,y) at am0+1.
Then, individual m0 + 1 has an incentive to reveal a false preference Ra
m0+1 when
his true preference is Rc
m0+1 because xPc
m0+1z for all z(, x,y). Therefore, we have
x ∈ C(am0+1) and y < C(am0+1). By the same logic we ﬁnd that when the preferences
of all individuals change from Ra
i to Rc
i, the social choice correspondence chooses
x and does not choose y (x ∈ C(c) and y < C(c)).
Now, suppose that from c to b the individual preferences change one by one
from Rc
i to Rb
i. Then, when the preference of some individual changes, the social
choice set can not change directly from a set which includes x and does not include
y to a set which includes y. If the social choice correspondence chooses y when
the preference of an individual in V or V0 (denoted by j) changes from Rc
j to Rb
j,
individual j has an incentive to reveal a false preference Rc
j when his true preference
is Rb
j because xPb
jy. On the other hand, if the social choice correspondence chooses








It remains the possibility, however, that the social choice set changes from a set
which includes x and does not include y through a set which includes z(, x,y) and
does not include x and y to a set which includes y. Suppose that when the prefer-
ences of some individuals change from Rc
i to Rb
i, the social choice correspondence
6chooses z(, x, y) and does not choose x and y, and further when the preference
of individual l changes from Rc
l to Rb
l, the social choice correspondence chooses
y. Then, individual l has an incentive to reveal a false preference Rb
l when his true
preference is Rc
l because yPc
lz. Therefore, we must have y < C(b). 
A group V in this lemma may be the set of all individuals, or may be a set
consisting of only one individual.
3 Equivalence of generalized monotonicity and strategy-proofness
In this section we show the equivalence of generalized monotonicity and strategy-
proofness.
Theorem 1. Generalized monotonicity implies strategy-proofness. Therefore, with
Lemma 2, generalized monotonicity and strategy-proofness are equivalent.
Proof. Denote the social choice sets at preference proﬁles a and b by Ca and Cb.
Between a and b only the preference of individual i is diﬀerent. Assume that a
social choice correspondence which satisﬁes generalized monotonicity is manipu-
lable. Then, there is a case where, either of the following (1) or (2) holds.
(1) For some x ∈ Ca and y ∈ Cb \Ca individual i’s preference is yPa
i x.
(2) For some x ∈ Ca \Cb and y ∈ Cb individual i’s preference is yPa
i x.
First consider (1). Comparing a and b, individual i has a preference yPa
i x at a
and the preferences of other individuals are the same. Thus, those who prefer x to
y at a prefer x to y also at b, and the preferences of individuals who are indiﬀerent
between x and y at a do not change. From generalized monotonicity, if y is not
included in Ca, it is not included in Cb. Therefore, there is not a case where (1)
holds.
Next consider (2). Comparing b and a, individual i has a preference yPa
i x at a
and the preferences of other individuals are the same. Thus, those who prefer y to
x at b prefer y to x also at a, and the preferences of individuals who are indiﬀerent
between x and y at b do not change or they prefer y to x at a (when individual i
is indiﬀerent between x and y at b). From generalized monotonicity, if x is not
included in Cb, it is not included in Ca. Therefore, there is not a case where (2)
holds. 
We have a conjecture that the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (Gibbard (1973)
and Satterthwaite (1975) can be extended to the case of non-resolute social choice
correspondences using generalized monotonicity.
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